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Résumé / Resumen / Abstract / Riassunto
In a complicated European climate, the “Yellow Vests Movement” in 
France throws a dark veil over the future of  the European Union, already 
strongly weakened by the Brexit. The extremely violent demonstrations 
that have rocked France in recent weeks clearly highlight the social divide 
now opposing the working class to the “elites”. Far from being an isolated 
case, the French discontent that led to the uprising is a symptom of  the 
deep crisis gnawing away Western democracies and threatening the Euro-
pean Project..
En un clima europeo complicado, el “Movimiento de los chalecos amari-
llos” en Francia arroja un oscuro velo sobre el futuro de la Unión Euro-
pea, ya muy debilitado por el Brexit. Las manifestaciones extremadamente 
violentas que han sacudido Francia en las últimas semanas claramente 
ponen de relieve la división social que ahora enfrente la clase obrera a las 
“élites”. Lejos de ser un caso aislado, el descontento francés que ha llevado 
a la revuelta es un síntoma de la profunda crisis que arrasa las democracias 
occidentales y amenaza el Proyecto Europeo..
Dans un climat européen déjà particulièrement tendu, le “Mouvement des 
gilets Jaunes” en France jette un voile sombre sur l’avenir de l’Union euro-
péenne, déjà fortement affaiblie par le Brexit. Les manifestations extrême-
ment violentes qui ont secoué l’Hexagone ces dernières semaines mettent 
clairement en exergue la fracture sociale en France et en Europe, opposant 
désormais la classe ouvrière aux “élites”. Bien loin d’être un cas isolé, le 
mécontentement français qui a conduit à la rébellion, est le symptome de 
la crise profonde qui ronge les démocraties occidentales et met en péril le 
Projet européen..
In un clima europeo complicato, il “Movimento dei giubbotti gialli” in 
Francia stende un oscuro velo sul futuro dell’Unione Europea, già forte-
mente indebolito dalla Brexit. Le manifestazioni estremamente violente 
che hanno scosso la Francia nelle ultime settimane evidenziano chiara-
mente la divisione sociale che ora oppone la classe operaia alle “élite”: 
lungi dall’essere un caso isolato, il malcontento francese che ha portato 
alla rivolta è un sintomo della profonda crisi che affligge le democrazie 
occidentali e minaccia il Progetto europeo.
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Just a few weeks after a tense fortnight of  negotiations 
on Brexit, and the turmoil caused by the deal, the EU 
must now face the challenges presented by the Euro-
pean-wide rise of  rightwing populism, Italy’s contagious 
anti-Brussels fiscal rebellion, Catalan regionalist aspira-
tion to independence and the fraught problems posed by 
mass migration into unstable, indebted southern Europe, 
without assistance from Britain. Given its strong demo-
cratic, parliamentary and public service traditions, attach-
ment to the rule of  law and commitment to free and fair 
trade, Britain was seen by many as a model, particularly 
in post-Soviet central and Eastern Europe. Its departure 
will create a vacuum and might have irremediable conse-
quences for the political future of  the European Union, 
if  any. Whatever European leaders may say, underesti-
mating Britain’s importance within the EU could be as 
damaging as overestimating it. Brexit also creates a prec-
edent that we will never be able to erase. The damage to 
the idea of  Europe will be considerable and lasting. 
It is in this already quite difficult context that France 
--whose 18-month-in-office young President, Emma-
nuel Macron, had clearly stated his European ambi-
tions, advocating for deeper EU political, budgetary 
and defense integration-- seems to be imploding. 
What was seen at first as another French -usual- pro-
test against an additional tax increase on fossil fuels, has 
turned into a rebellion. Demonstrations led to some 
of  the worst urban violence in France since the May 
1968 uprising and were marked by skirmishes between 
stone-throwing protesters and police officers firing tear 
gas, shattered store windows, burning cars and looting. 
Other parallels have even been drawn with the French 
Revolution, comparing the 2018 Yellow Vests pro-
tests for affordable gas to the march of  the 7000 fam-
ished-working-women, from Paris to Versailles, under 
the rain, with pikes and pitchfork, screaming “on veut du 
pain!” (we want bread!) on October 5th, 1789.
Yet, if  the gasoline tax increase was the sparkle 
which started the fire, it would be a huge mistake to 
analyze it as the cause of  the uprising. It might have 
triggered it, but there are deeper root causes and more 
fundamental reasons:
First of  all are indeed economic reasons, and especially the 
constant decline of  living standards for the last ten years. In 
January 2016, the national statistical institute Insée announced 
that life expectancy had fallen for both sexes in France for the 
first time since World War II, and it’s the native French working 
class that is likely driving the decline. In fact, the French outsi-
ders are looking a lot like the poor Americans Charles Murray 
described in Coming Apart, failing not just in income and longe-
vity but also in family formation, mental health, and education. 
Their political alienation is striking. Fewer than 2 percent of  
legislators in France’s National Assembly today come from the 
working class, as opposed to 20 percent just after World War 
II. The first victims of  this economical regression are the se-
niors (retirees who can barely survive with their pension and 
cannot help their children anymore as they used to), and the 
youth. Three years after finishing their studies, three-quarters 
of  French university graduates are living on their own; by con-
trast, three-quarters of  their contemporaries without university 
degrees still live with their parents. 
Second of  all, are the fiscal reasons: France is one 
the most taxed country within the European Union. 
According to the latest Eurostat report that looks at the 
percentage of  a country’s GDP that comes from tax 
receipts France is top of  the European league. Some 
47.7% of  the country’s GDP is from tax revenues in 
2017. (European Commission, 2018).  If  historically 
France has always defended paying high taxes as the 
price to pay for the public services as well as the wel-
fare state that provides protection for the worse off, 
the country has reached its limits. In that context, high 
taxes on gasoline and diesel fuels are another “effort” 
asked to the citizens who were already struggling, for 
most of  them. French citizens had actually been quite 
patient in accepting high carbon taxes. The cost of  gas 
has never stopped increasing since 2007 and has rea-
ched 1,8 €/ liter in 2018, or more than $6 (USD) par 
gallon, with taxes accounting for 60 percent.
Yet, the main reason at the root of  the “Yellow 
Vests” movement is, in my opinion, more sociological. 
Despite the fact it took by surprise, the “Yellow Vests” 
movement is the result of  a growing discontent and 
mistrust towards the institutions and the political par-
ties – both of  which have been latent for a long time 
already- and, as such, could have been anticipated rath-
























er sooner than later. Yet, it was totally unanticipated by 
the government as well as by the political parties. While 
reaching its sixth week of  violence, the movement re-
mains paradoxically unstructured, which emphasizes 
even more the profound distrust of  institutions and 
political parties. The “Yellow Vests” movement reflects 
a deeply fractured French society. It is the symptom 
of  a spontaneous and self-determined uprising of  the 
working class, feeling left behind and even despised by 
their political leaders that they reject as part of  “met-
ropolitans elites”. Therefore, “ the partial sacking of  
Paris’ rich, tourism-dominated districts last weekend 
was merely the physical expression of  what all these 
movements feel deeply, in the view of  analysts: hatred 
of  the “winners” in the global system, symbolized by 
urban elites. ” (Nossiter, Dec. 5, 2018) 
Far from being a French exception, this phenome-
non is the symptom of  the fear common to most Eu-
ropean workers, feeling endangered by the current eco-
nomic model seen as integrating only a small amount 
of  the population: the so-called “elite”. For the last few 
years, similar exasperation has been clearly expressed 
in Britain –leading to the Brexit- but also in Germa-
ny, Spain and several other member states, especially in 
Southern Europe. Indeed, in 2009 Italy already faced a 
similar uprising, organized by “il Movimento 5 Stelle” (The 
Five Star Movement), which grew up out of  a similar 
disgust with political parties and a distrust of  elites, and 
which has held itself  out as the authentic expression 
of  the popular will. As Christophe Guillluy analyzed, 
“from the 1980s onwards, it was clear there was a price 
to be paid for western societies adapting to a new eco-
nomic model and that price was sacrificing the Euro-
pean and American working class. No one thought the 
fallout would hit the bedrock of  the lower-middle class, 
too. It’s obvious now, however, that the new model not 
only weakened the fringes of  the proletariat but society 
as a whole.” (Guilluy, 2015 and 2018)
To better understand the roots of  such a large mis-
trust and discontent, a global vision --which many Eu-
ropean political leaders have been lacking of  for quite 
some time— is of  utmost importance. In Europe, since 
2010, there have been indications that the international 
financial crisis, which started in the US in 2007, has been 
evolving into a social epidemic. In France, as in all west-
ern countries, the social climate has mutated from a sys-
tem, which used to integrate the majority economically, 
politically and culturally into an unequal monster that 
benefits only the already wealthy, by creating even more 
wealth. Due to the strategic character of  the financial 
sector, both public and political debates have focused 
on the economic aspects of  the crisis, as well as on the 
major factors that have conditioned its evolution: man-
agement of  the public debt, the response to the housing 
bubble and the evolution of  broader economic activity. 
In contrast, the issue of  social cohesion has been left 
behind, perceived as collateral damage “only”. Yet, 118 
million of  people were living below the poverty thresh-
old within the EU in 2016, and thus “considered at risk 
of  poverty or social exclusion”1  (Eurostat). There has 
been an obvious failure to address the recession “both 
from the perspective of  social investment, which em-
phasizes the productivity of  the human factor, and 
from the perspective of  social sustainability, which rais-
es the necessity of  preserving social capital, understood 
as “the wealth of  institutions, community relations and 
cultural patterns that increase the potential of  a society 
to face future challenges.” (Laparra, 2012).
Although all European Union countries have expe-
rienced rising social needs, poverty and inequality have 
appeared in each case with different levels of  intensity 
and scope. Changes in unemployment have not been 
uniform, with great variations in rates among countries. 
Thus, common trends are striking and should not be 
ignored any longer: since 2010, rising unemployment 
in many countries and the falling wages of  the wor-
kers with the fewest resources have in many cases led 
to a stagnation or even decline in living standards and 
a rapid increase in social vulnerability. Simultaneously, 
increasing difficulties in financing social spending have 
limited the ability of  the safety net to meet the unprece-
dented increase in demand for redistributive public po-
1 Source : Eurostat EU-27 and EU-28, 2005–2016.
























licies. The economic divide has led to a fracture within 
the European society, opposing the working-class and 
lower middle-class to the so-called elites. As Michael J. 
Sandel explained, “one of  the biggest failures of  the 
last generation of  mainstream parties has been the fai-
lure to take seriously and to speak directly to people’s 
aspiration to feel that they have some meaningful say in 
shaping the forces that govern their lives.” Thus, a large 
constituency of  working-class voters feel that not only 
has the economy left them behind, but so has the cultu-
re, that the sources of  their dignity, the dignity of  labor, 
have been eroded and mocked by developments with 
globalization. (Sandel/Cowley, 2016). The Brexit was 
the first striking European example of  this failure, the 
violent divide currently opposing “la France périphéri-
que” (peripheral France) to Paris and the metropolises 
is another one, emphasizing not only social despair but 
a sense of  disempowerment. Indeed, as the French, 
many European citizens feel bereft of  their capital, not 
only financially but also socially and culturally. There 
is an urgent need to address the democratic failure not 
only in France, but in Europe and most western coun-
tries. Social democracy is in desperate need of  reinvigo-
ration, because it has over the past several decades lost 
its moral and civic energy and purpose. It’s become a 
largely managerial and technocratic orientation to po-
litics. It has lost its ability to inspire working people, 
and its vision, its moral and civic vision, has faltered. 
So for two generations after the Second World War, 
social democracy did have an animating vision, which 
was to create and to deepen and to articulate welfare 
states, and to moderate and provide a counterbalance 
to the power of  unfettered market capitalism. (Sandel/
Cowley, 2016).
As the French Yellow Vests’ uprising has demon-
strated, not only are there economic distress, a deep 
social fracture and a massive popular discontent, but 
there is also an urgent need for Europe to reconnect 
with its citizens and make them feel empowered in a 
meaningful project. Many scenarios have been sug-
gested and studied by experts and scholars regarding 
the future of  Europe – the most probable one being 
a North-South European split, in which Germany, the 
Netherlands, the Scandinavian and Baltic states could 
break away to form a sort of  modern-day version of  
the Hanseatic League. If  that point were reached, the 
very idea of  a union of  Europe would most probably 
forever die. What made Europe so unique, so special 
and even “great” was the fact it raised from the ashes of  
a continent almost fully destroyed by three consecutive 
of  the most atrocious wars the world has ever seen. It 
was built as a dream of  common and eternal peace, on 
the European Enlightenment’s legacy of  open societies 
based on legal rights, obligations and individual free-
doms. For several generations, it meant more freedom, 
of  speech and expression, of  traveling without borders, 
more opportunities as well, allowing several Erasmus 
generations to go study in another European country, 
and workers to move without any restrictions. It used 
to symbolize a better future for our children, protecting 
the arts and the environment, and developing educative 
and research projects. What happened to that vision of  
Europe? Instead, in the eyes of  many, it has become 
the symbol of  a series of  cold and inappropriate po-
litical decisions social regression, and staggering quest 
for competitiveness. If  there were still a future left for 
the European project, it would have to be dedicated to 
protect its citizens, while empowering them in a mean-
ingful and socially cohesive Union.
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